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Syndicate Size In Global IPO Underwriting 





This study analyzes factors that determine syndicate size in ADR IPO underwriting.  The information 
gathering role of investment bankers, complexity and risk of issue, corporate governance and 
transparency environment factors, and potential business relations are the basis for the analyses.  
Empirical results indicate decreasing syndicate size over time.  No significant relation is found 
between syndicate size and initial day return of IPOs.  The transparency environment, dilution effect 
of the issue, growth stage of the issuer, lead underwriter reputation, offering size and ownership 





 company that desires to issue securities to raise capital has two options: self-underwrite its security or 
enter into a contract with investment banker(s) to underwrite the security.  If it chose to engage an 
underwriter, there are two types of contracts: best efforts and firm commitment contracts.  Under best 
efforts contract, the firm assumes the risk of distribution.  The investment banker makes its best effort to sell the issue 
and the company gets its capital net of underwriter compensation piecemeal as each share is sold.  The investment 
bankers’ responsibilities are managing the issue and selling.  Under firm commitment contracts, the underwriters buy 
the securities from the issuing firm and sell them to the public.  The firm gets its capital (net of underwriters’ 
compensation) immediately and the risk of distribution is shouldered by the investment bankers.  The investment 
bankers underwrite, manage and sell the issue. 
 
In either case, the issuing company selects an investment banker and enters into an underwriting contract.  
The investment banker that won the contract invites other investment bankers and forms a syndicate.  Why would it 
invite others and share its business?  Probable reasons are (1) it needs to share the capital commitment necessary to 
underwrite the security issue, (2) it needs to share the marketing effort to sell the shares, (3) it needs to share expertise 
and skills in securities underwriting to price the shares more accurately, (4) it needs to establish business relations 
since those invited to the syndicate would likely invite it when they win future underwriting contracts, and (5) 
sometimes the issuing firm desires inclusion of some investment banks in the syndicate.  These imply that size of the 
issue, riskiness of the issue, the size and reputation of the investment banker, the desire of partnership relations and 
complexity of the issue determine the size and composition of an underwriting syndicate.  This paper tests these 
variables for ADR IPO issues. 
 
Syndication is a major financial intermediation role played by investment bankers and in the case of loan 
syndication, by commercial banks, insurance companies and other financial institutions.  This project will examine the 
syndication of underwriting securities.  More specifically, it examines the underwriting of American Depositary 
Receipts (ADR) Initial Public Offering (IPO).  ADRs are foreign company negotiable instruments that trade on US 
stock exchanges.  Since they represent foreign companies that are large in size and usually of global reputation, their 
syndication presents an opportunity to examine the issue of syndicate formation and syndicate size on a global scale.  
The selection of IPO underwriting helps examine the issue of underwriting risk that syndicate members face.   
 
Investment bankers perform three main functions in the issuance of stocks: (1) Leading or managing the 
syndication, which is an organizing role, (2) underwriting, which requires capital commitment and (3) selling or 
distributing the securities to the public. One or more investment bankers are managers (or lead underwriters).  The rest 
of the syndicate members may engage in underwriting and/or selling.   The fee for the investment bankers is called 
gross spread and averages 7% of the issue size (Chen and Ritter (2000)).  The gross spread is divided into the three 
functions described above: management fee, underwriting fee and selling concessions and each constitutes 20%, 20% 
A 
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and 60% on average (Torstila (2001)).  Each member of the syndicate gets from these fees depending on its 
participation and its contribution.  If an investment bank wins the contract from an issuing company, manages, 
underwrites and sells the securities alone, it can keep the entire fee.  So why would an investment banker invite others 
to the syndicate and share its business and its revenue?  
 
The paper is organized as follows.  The following section presents some theoretical framework and 




Information Generation Hypothesis 
 
Corwin and Schultz (2005) examine the information generating role of syndicates and indicate that the larger 
the syndicate size, the better the information gathering and the more accurate the pricing of the securities.  So, one 
reason for inviting more underwriters to a syndicate is to help reduce information asymmetry and price securities more 
accurately.  This implies, in the case of IPOs, that issues with large syndicate would be less underpriced than issues 
with few underwriters.  More accurate pricing of IPO shares helps to reduce the risk investment bankers face to their 
reputation from the issuing companies if securities are underpriced and the class action law suits they face from 
investors if the securities are overpriced and investors lose subsequent to the issue. Ejara and Ghosh (2004) report that 
on the average, the syndicate size for ADR IPOs is larger than for US IPOs and ADR IPOs are less underpriced than 
US IPOs.  This is consistent with Corwin and Schultz (2005) since ADR IPOs are foreign companies and more 
information gathering is necessary.   
 
Skill Sharing Or Acquisition 
 
Underwriters need skills in underwriting.  If the issue is of special nature in terms of industry, region, type of 
issue, complexity, etc. special skills may be needed.  It is likely that the lead underwriter includes in the syndicate 
Asian underwriters for ADR IPOs from Asia and European underwriters for ADR issues from Europe.  Such 
invitations can sometimes be due to the desire to establish future business relations.  An invited investment banker is 
likely to invite when it wins business.  According to Smith and Walter (2003) in international loan syndication, an 
investment bank’s visibility could be enhanced for being in a syndicate together with a bank with high reputation.  




Underwriters face different types of risk.  One is the risk of failure of the issue.  In firm commitment 
contracts, investment banks face the risk of distribution of the shares in the issue.  If the issue fails, their capital would 
be tied up for long period and they may actually lose.  Increasing syndicate size reduces such risk through better 
information gathering, marketing skills, sharing effort and also reducing the size of exposure to each underwriter.  
This becomes even more important if the issue size is large and if the investment banker is not large (see Foster 
(1989)). Second, if the issuing firm underperforms subsequent to issue and shareholders lose on their investment, the 
underwriters face class action law suit which damages their reputations. Increasing syndicate size helps reduce this 
risk indirectly through better information gathering and underwriting skill contribution.  Better information gathering 




Corporate issuers sometimes want to include their favorite investment banker in the syndicate.  This could be 
because of existing or potential future business relations.  Sometimes, a corporate issuer may limit the size of the 
syndicate by questioning the merits of including each underwriter in the syndicate.  Tunick (2004) and Wirth (1997) 
describe the recent declining trend in the size of underwriting syndicate as resulting from issuing firms’ increasing 
bargaining power in the securities markets, underwriters endowment with large capital and the availability of different 
risk management techniques in today’s financial markets. 
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Corporate Transparency Environment 
 
As stated above, one key role of investment banks is information production.  Information generation is 
difficult if the corporate governance environment is poor and allows for little disclosure.  There are two aspects of 
transparency environment: the internal corporate governance structure and the outside country corporate governance 
practices.  Tight corporate control, where the CEO is entrenched, and concentrated ownership of shares allow for 
greater private benefits of control (Benos and Weisbach (2004).  According to Dyck and Zingales (2002), such private 
benefits of control in the form of expropriation of corporate wealth through different means are inversely related to the 
quality of the country’s corporate governance environment and disclosure requirements.  Private benefits from control 
are greater in countries rife with corruption, unstable political environment, poor accountability and poor enforcement 
of the rule of the law.  So the internal corporate governance structure and the external transparency environment 
reinforce each other.  Large syndicate is needed for an issue by a firm with concentrated ownership and/or tight 
control of company by few executives and poor transparency environment. 
 
 
Table 1: Variable Definition And Hypothesized Relations 
 











DEV Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the IPO is from Developed country and 0 otherwise - 
HITECH Dummy variable with a value of 1 if the IPO firm is a hi-tech company and 0 otherwise - 
TRANSP Index of country transparency (World Bank rating) - 
HHB HH Index of ownership concentration before IPO issue + 
DILUTION Ratio of primary shares offered in the IPO to shares outstanding before IPO - 
PARTICI Ratio of secondary shares offered in the IPO to shares outstanding before IPO + 
OFFERV Value of total shares offered at IPO offer price (shares offered x offer price per share) + 
LVALUE log of offer value + 
TA Total assets in millions of dollars before IPO + 
LTA log of total assets + 
REVG1 Revenue growth rate during the year before IPO - 
PROCEEDS dummy variable with a value of 1 if the firm gets proceeds from the issue, and 0 otherwise - 
IR initial day return (underpricing of the IPO) - 
AGE age of the firm in years at IPO - 
SNPRE1 S&P500 index return the first day of IPO + 
URANK lead underwriter rank based on Carter-Manaster system - 
PPADJU partial price adjustment (%) + 
PVADJU volume adjustment (%) + 
REGIWAIT waiting period in registration (days) - 
RISK standard dev. Of daily returns for 60-days after IPO + 
SNPQ S&P500 index return one quarter before IPO date + 
INSIDER Percent of shares owned by insiders before IPO + 





Based on the above discussions, I hypothesize that underwriter syndicate is positively related to the riskiness 
of the issuer, the size of the issue, complexity of the issue, ownership concentration, and performance of the stock 
market.  Syndicate size is expected to have negative sign with age of the issuing firm, underwriter rank, transparency 
environment, degree of dilution of ownership in the offering, and the time trend.  Table 1 above presents details of the 
explanatory variables and expected relationship with syndicate size. 
 




The list of ADR IPOs is obtained from Bank of New York and Citibank ADR Departments.  This list is 
verified against IPO lists in Investment Dealers’ Digest.  Further verification is made by referring to the prospectuses 
of each IPO.  The prospectuses state if there were any trading in the underlying shares before ADR issue.  If there is 
any, that issue is not an IPO and does not enter the sample.  After such verifications, 188 ADR IPO sample is 
established.  55 (29%) of them are from emerging market countries and the remaining 133 (71%) are from developed 
countries.  21 cases are privatizations of previously government owned enterprises. 
 
Company specific data items such as corporate governance variables, offer price, number of shares offered, 
ownership distribution before issue, total assets, revenues, number of shares issued by original owners, number of new 
shares issued by the company, age of the company, etc. are hand collected from the prospectuses.  Herfindahl-
Hirschman (HH) Index for ownership concentration is calculated by grouping pre-IPO ownership into CEO and 
affiliates, other insiders, outside corporate, government, Institutions, investment banks if they are part of the 
underwriting syndicate, venture capitalists and others.  S&P500 index values are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) tape.  Post-IPO stock prices are also obtained from CRSP and daily return 
volatilities are calculated based on the first 60-days of trading.  Underwriter rank is the Carter and Manaster (1990) 
reputation ranking and is obtained from Ritter (2001). 
 
Country corporate governance transparency index is obtained from the World Bank study by Kaufmann, 
Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003).  This study establishes index values ranging from -2.5 (worst governance environment) 
to 2.5 (best governance environment) for all countries for 1996-2002.  The index used in this study is average over the 
years for each country.  
 
ANALYSES AND RESULTS 
 
Table 2 presents description of the data and preliminary mean comparisons of syndicate size with respect to 
some variables.  The average syndicate size for the IPOs in the sample is 17.63 (median is 15).  Variation of syndicate 
size over the years is statistically significant at 5% level.  As Panel A shows, the hot IPO periods of mid 1990s have 
larger size syndicates on average than the later IPOs. 
 
Panel B compares syndicate sizes of IPOs from developed countries to those from emerging markets.  Both 
the average and the median figures show that emerging market ADRs require more underwriters than developed 
market ADRs although the difference is not statistically significant.  The fact that emerging market IPOs require 
larger syndicate supports the notion that it is more difficult to gather information in developing countries and hence 
the need for more underwriters. 
 
Privatization IPOs require an average of 25 (median 25) underwriters while non-privatization IPOs require an 
average of about 17 (median 14) underwriters and the difference is statistically significant at 5% level.  Privatization 
issues represent the sale of formerly government owned enterprises and hence the deal is more complex.     
 
The other groupings in Table 2 don’t show statistically significant differences. Hi-Tech industry IPOs require 
fewer underwriters than others, but the difference is not significant.  Firms whose CEOs are chairman of the board 
require more underwriters than others, but the difference is not significant.  CEO being chairman of the board implies 
tight corporate control.  Similarly, if insiders own 5% - 25% of the shares, it implies greater managerial entrenchment 
following Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and hence a need for large syndicate to gather adequate information.  




Tables 3 and 4 present heteroskedasticity corrected regression results of syndicate size on various explanatory 
variables.  In Table 3 syndicate size is the dependent variable; in Table 4 log transformed syndicate size is the 
dependent variable.  Also in Table 4, total asset size and the total value of shares issued are log transformed. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics Of Syndicate Size 
 
Syndicate Size Comparison By Different Classifications 
A) Year of Issue* N Mean Median Std. Deviation 
1990 1 50.00 50.00 . 
1991 1 73.00 73.00 . 
1992 2 36.50 36.50 38.89 
1993 15 26.40 19.00 20.59 
1994 23 20.26 19.00 14.16 
1995 21 25.05 25.00 12.51 
1996 36 21.86 23.00 9.78 
1997 23 15.04 14.00 9.06 
1998 15 12.27 10.00 9.83 
1999 19 7.42 5.00 5.47 
2000 29 8.21 6.00 6.22 
2001 3 11.67 11.00 4.04 
Total 188 17.63 15.00 13.94 
B) Country Development 
Emerging market issuer 55 19.93 16.00 14.93 
Developed Market Issuer 133 16.68 14.00 13.46 
Total 188 17.63 15.00 13.94 
C) Privatization* 
Non-Privatization 167 16.72 14.00 13.10 
Privatization 21 24.86 25.00 18.18 
Total 188 17.63 15.00 13.94 
D) Industry 
Non-Hi-Tech Issuer 105 18.78 16.00 13.76 
Hi-Tech Issuer 83 16.18 14.00 14.11 
Total 188 17.63 15.00 13.94 
E) CEO 
CEO is not Chairman of board 126 16.49 13.50 12.88 
CEO is chairman of board 62 19.95 17.00 15.74 
Total 188 17.63 15.00 13.94 
F) Insider Ownership 
Insider ownership outside 5%-25% 152 18.34 15.50 14.56 
Insider Ownership between 5% and 25% 36 14.67 12.50 10.63 
Total 188 17.63 15.00 13.94 
* mean difference between categories significant at 5% level 
 
 
Ownership concentration, measured by HH index, and lead underwriter rank are the only variables with 
significant positive coefficients when syndicate size is the dependent variable.  Positive relation between HH index 
and syndicate size is consistent with what is hypothesized.  High concentration of ownership requires greater effort to 
generate information and hence large size syndicate.  The positive coefficient with underwriter rank is inconsistent 
with expectation.  If the lead underwriter is highly reputed, it is likely that it has large capital at its disposal and the 
need to invite large syndicate diminishes.  Privatization dummy is marginally significant at 10% level in the third 
model.  Its coefficients are consistently positive in each of the models.  Given that privatization issues involve transfer 
of ownership and control from government to the private sector, it is more complicated and requires relatively larger 
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Table 3. Heteroskedasticity Adjusted Multiple Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable Is Syndicate Size.  Independent Variables Are As Defined In Table 1. 
Variable Name Estimated Coefficients 
NEW -12.52700*** -12.51400*** -12.95700*** 
DEV 1.20540 1.08410 2.26620 
HITECH 0.35377 0.37297 0.29769 
TRANSP -0.82818 -0.81197 -0.92312 
HHB 8.13590** 8.06360** 7.98380** 
DILUTION -0.02706*** -0.02669*** -0.02786*** 
PARTICI -0.02462 -0.02334 -0.02160 
OFFERV -0.00003*** -0.00003***  
TA -0.00002  -0.00006 
REVG1 -0.00241*** -0.00239*** -0.00240*** 
PROCEEDS -6.87950** -6.84070** -6.44490* 
IR 0.00324 0.00325 0.00442 
AGE -0.03506 -0.03505 -0.03304 
SNPRE1 0.06014 0.06064 0.07669 
URANK 1.68630** 1.69150** 1.68010** 
PPADJU -0.01423 -0.01470 -0.01386 
PVADJU 0.00494 0.00393 0.00947 
REGIWAIT -0.01051** -0.01053** -0.01004* 
RISK -0.52642 -0.52149 -0.52755 
SNPQ 0.01918 0.01803 0.02898 
INSIDER -0.01070 -0.01039 -0.00831 
PRVT 5.96440 5.64070 6.90060* 
CONSTANT 13.02800* 13.00000* 11.95500* 
N 174 174 174 
R-Squared 42.29% 42.28% 41.66% 
***, ** and * indicate significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively 
 
 
NEW, the dummy variable with a value of 1 for issues after 1996 and 0 otherwise, has a significant negative 
coefficient.  This is consistent with the trend.  Underwriting syndicate size is decreasing over time for various reasons 
as stated by Wirth (1997) and Tunick (2004).  Dilution has significant negative coefficient.  This indicates that issuing 
more new shares decreases ownership concentration and makes it easier for underwriters to generate information.  
Offer size (in dollars) has significant negative coefficient.  This is inconsistent with expectations since large size 
offering requires large underwriting capital and hence large syndicate.   Revenue growth rate of issuer also has 
significant negative coefficient.  Companies with high growth rate are probably less complicated to require large 
syndicate especially if they are young.  The negative coefficients for the Age variable are consistent with this notion, 
but they are statistically insignificant.  The PROCEEDS dummy which indicates whether the issuer receives some 
proceeds from the IPO issue or not, has significant negative coefficient.  If the issuer receives proceeds from the issue, 
there may be strong interest on the part of the company executives to limit the syndicate size in order to reduce total 
issuing cost.  REGIWAIT, waiting time in registration with the SEC, has significant negative coefficient, which 
indicates issues with small size syndicate may not satisfy SEC disclosure requirements that easily.  SEC requests 
revision and modification if the original filing is not satisfactory.  This result supports the information generation role 
of underwriters. 
 
The results based on log transform of syndicate size, issue size in dollars and total assets are similar.  As 
Table 4 shows the only changes are that HH index, PROCEEDS, and log of issue size are not significant anymore.  
Developed country dummy and transparency environment become significant.  The results imply that developed 
country issues require larger size syndicates than emerging market issues.  This is inconsistent with the results in 
Table 2 and with the notion that emerging markets environment is more complicated and less transparent.  The 
negative coefficient for the transparency variable is consistent with expectations.  Issues from more transparent 
environments require small syndicates. 
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The overall results indicate that the time trend, ownership concentration, the transparency of the issuing 
environments and growth rate of the issuer dominate other factors in determining syndicate size.  The size of the 
company, issue size, risk and stock market performance around issue time are not significantly important.  Also no 
significant relation is found between syndicate size and IPO underpricing. 
 
Table 4. Heteroskedasticity Adjusted Multiple Regression Results 
 
Dependent Variable Is Log Of Syndicate Size.  Independent Variables Are As Defined In Table 1. 
Variable Name Estimated Coefficients 
NEW -0.73628*** -0.70987*** -0.73996*** 
DEV 0.28817* 0.28424* 0.31501* 
HITECH -0.09017 -0.09592 -0.10440 
TRANSP -0.13031** -0.13029** -0.13117*** 
HHB 0.32715 0.40946 0.30059 
DILUTION -0.00136*** -0.00141*** -0.00135*** 
PARTICI 0.00188 0.00097 0.00208 
LVALUE -0.01629 -0.00145  
LTA 0.05052  0.04288 
REVG1 -0.00011*** -0.00011*** -0.00011*** 
PROCEEDS -0.11528 -0.16966 -0.11614 
IR 0.00023 0.00013 0.00016 
AGE -0.00157 -0.00116 -0.00160 
SNPRE1 0.02384 0.02306 0.02387 
URANK 0.22291*** 0.23660*** 0.22141*** 
PPADJU -0.00007 -0.00008 -0.00025 
PVADJU 0.00076 0.00038 0.00086 
REGIWAIT -0.00065* -0.00066* -0.00066* 
RISK -0.03545 -0.04753 -0.03330 
SNPQ 0.00385 0.00354 0.00397 
INSIDER -0.00224 -0.00263 -0.00210 
PRVT 0.20120 0.28771 0.20112 
CONSTANT 0.78732 0.89491 0.74395 
N 174 174 174 
R-Squared 44.56% 44.10% 44.48% 





This study examines the factors that influence the underwriting syndicate size in global IPO offering. 
Previous studies state that underwriters have a major role of information generation.  Consistent with that I 
hypothesized that transparency environment, corporate governance, risk, market conditions, size of issue, size of the 
issuer, potential future business relationships, complexity of the deal and the need to share skills determine syndicate 
size.  Empirical analysis presented supports at least partly that ownership concentration, dilution, growth stage of the 
issuer, transparency environment and the time trend significantly influence syndicate size. 
 
There are some issues that this study raises but does not answer.  Further study is necessary to establish the 
extent to which underwriters invite each other to syndicates for potential business relationships.  Risk is found to have 
insignificant effect in this study.  This is probably due to the different risk management techniques available to 
investment banks today.  There may also be differences in the riskiness of the IPO company, which is measured in this 
study, and the risk from the economic environment at the time of the issue.  The effect of risk during hot and cold IPO 
periods may be different.  The repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act in 1999 allowed commercial banks, investment banks 
and investment companies to merge.  Such mergers increase the capital available to the underwriter and decrease the 
need to form syndicate to share capital commitment.  Such recent trends should be examined in future studies. 
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